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Background to the debate: Pharmaceutical and medical
device manufacturers argue that the current patent
system is crucial for stimulating research and develop-
ment (R&D), leading to new products that improve
medical care. The financial return on their investments
that is afforded by patent protection, they claim, is an
incentive toward innovation and reinvestment into
further R&D. But this view has been challenged in recent
years. Many commentators argue that patents are stifling
biomedical research, for example by preventing research-
ers from accessing patented materials or methods they
need for their studies. Patents have also been blamed for
impeding medical care by raising prices of essential
medicines, such as antiretroviral drugs, in poor countries.
This debate examines whether and how patents are
impeding health care and innovation.
E. Richard Gold’s Viewpoint: We Could Increase
the Productivity of Biomedical Innovation
Systems by Rethinking How We Use Patents
The question posed in the title of this PLoS Medicine debate
seems to be a simple one, but there is a complex spectrum of
answers depending on how one interprets the question. In this
article, I lay out four different interpretations and their
corresponding answers.
How Are Existing Patent Rights Impeding Medical Care
and Innovation?
The narrowest version of the question focuses on the effect of
existing patents held by actors (industry, university, government
laboratories, etc.) on medical care and innovation.
In high-income countries, the evidence suggests that existing
patents increase the cost of medicines [1]. Whether patents
increase the cost of other services, such as diagnostics, is unclear
[2]. For example, in their recent analysis of patents on genetic
testing, Robert Cook-Deegan and colleagues concluded that
‘‘prices of patented and exclusively licensed tests are not
dramatically or consistently higher than those of tests without a
monopoly’’ [2]. What impact do existing patents have on the total
cost of medical care in rich countries? Again, the evidence is
unclear. Patents could conceivably reduce the total cost of care if
new patented medicines turn out to be cheaper than existing
medical interventions.
In those low- and middle-income countries in which current
medications are subject to patent rights, existing patents seem to
make medicines more expensive and increase the difficulty of
creating novel mechanisms through which to deliver medicines
[3,4]. In all countries, existing patents make research and
development more expensive for the simple reason that research-
ers and companies must clear patent rights to do their work.
Whether this cost is offset by other benefits is a subject I turn to
next.
How Is The Prospect of Obtaining Patent Rights
Impeding Medical Care and Innovation?
The theory underlying patent rights is that patents encourage
people to invest in bringing a compound through clinical trials and
into practice [5,6]. The prospect of future patents may, therefore,
increase innovation today and may increase medical care by
encouraging manufacturers to introduce new medicines [7]. While
pharmaceutical companies spend almost twice as much on
marketing than on research [8], they nevertheless invest heavily
in developing new medicines.
Two questions remain, however. First, while patents provide an
incentive to bring a new product to market, are these incentives
better than those provided by alternative mechanisms? We know
that existing business strategies of both pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies rely heavily on patents [6,9], but this
does not prove that they could not have developed strategies that
did not rely on patents. It appears that the biomedical industry’s
reliance on patents is historically arbitrary [10], rather than being
necessary to spur innovation. So, for example, would a prize
awarded to those who discover new medicines be a better
mechanism than using patents [11]? Neither theory nor evidence
provides a clear answer. Second, are the benefits of patents in
encouraging the development of new medicines offset by the
increased prices we pay for existing medicines and by the higher
fees that researchers must pay? Again, empirical research is
inconclusive but is strongest in the biomedical sector [10]. In the
end, we have no better answer today than in the 1950s when
economists Edith Penrose and Fritz Machlup concluded that the
evidence supporting or undermining the patent system is lacking
[12,13].
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How Is The Patent System Impeding Medical Care and
Innovation?
If we look at the outcomes of biomedical innovation, a different
answer emerges. The patent system—not just patent rights but
how they are obtained and used—has resulted in an innovation
system characterized by a dramatic increase in health care costs
and decreasing (quantitatively and qualitatively) levels of innova-
tion, especially by dollar spent [9]. While one cannot say that these
problems are inherent in patent law they are, nevertheless, an
outcome of the manner in which actors deploy patent rights.
The evidence points to a crisis in biomedical innovation even if
not to a solution. While health care costs are increasing rapidly,
the fastest growing component of those costs are pharmaceutical
products [14]. The costs of developing a new medicine from
discovery through clinical trials appear to double every decade
[15]. Yet, despite increasing investments in research and
development, industry is producing fewer new drugs every year
of which a declining percentage is truly innovative [16]. Beyond
this, investments in the health needs of developing countries
remains very low by any standard, and patents continue to get in
the way of modifying existing medicines for the needs of those
countries [3].
All of this shows an industry in serious difficulty and a health
care system facing unsustainable cost increases and fewer new
products. There are many reasons for this crisis that stretch well
beyond the patent system. To the extent, however, that the
industry’s current business models are build around patents, the
patent system itself must shoulder its share of responsibility.
Would a Different Deployment of Patents Impede Health
Care and Innovation?
While some nongovernmental organizations call for the creation
of alternatives to the patent system, such as prize systems [11],
these are even less proven than the patent system in sustaining
innovation and increasing health care. A more practical solution to
the problems described above is not to do away with patent rights
but to use them more wisely. This means everything from deciding
not to apply for patents over certain inventions, as does the
Structural Genomics Consortium [17], to licensing out patent
rights widely for research purposes, as does the Health Commons
(http://www.healthcommons.net/), through to exploring the
possibility of creating ‘‘open source’’ licenses in biomedicine
[18]. None of these strategies require changing patent laws, but all
present a serious challenge to the way that universities and
industry obtain and deploy patent rights.
Conclusion
There are many questions buried within the question ‘‘How are
patents impeding medical care and innovation?’’ At bottom, we do know
that our biomedical innovation system is too expensive and too
unproductive and that patents play an important role within that
system. If, in the end, it is results that count, then it is certainly
time to question the business models that sit on top of our existing
patent system [9,18].
Warren Kaplan’s Viewpoint: The Evidence on
Whether Patents Impede Medical Innovation Is
Ambiguous
The complicated debate about whether or not patents impede
‘‘downstream’’ medical care and ‘‘upstream’’ medical innovation
is ultimately about access to such care and innovation, which are at
opposite ends of a ‘‘chain’’ of biomedicine.
Access to Medical Care
Clinical research is costly, lengthy, and high-risk. Pharmaceu-
tical companies apply for patents on new drugs to gain market
exclusivity for a limited period. The aim of this exclusivity is to
generate revenue from sales and recoup the substantial cost of
drug development by collecting fees (‘‘royalties’’) from users of the
patented technology. Pharmaceutical companies also fund their
research from these fees. Patented pharmaceuticals cost more than
identical medicines that are off-patent. Access to medicines is
inhibited by high prices. Patents are a factor in inhibiting access to
pharmaceutical treatment, particularly in low- and middle-income
countries [8,20–22].
For medical devices, large manufacturers continue to benefit
from price increases on patent-protected devices. As with
pharmaceuticals, iterative improvements in performance and
safety of existing devices are typically patented. These patents
can, in principle, create barriers to market entry for new
competitors. Nonetheless, the literature on the impact of patents
on access to medical devices is slim compared to that for
pharmaceuticals.
The impact of gene patents on genetic testing has garnered
much recent press and academic interest [23–26], including a
lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union against Myriad
Genetics charging that patents on two human genes associated
with breast and ovarian cancer stifle research that could lead to
cures [27]. The lawsuit argues that the patents on these genes are
unconstitutional and invalid. But in fact, there is little in the way of
consistent evidence to suggest that gene patents inhibit patient
access to diagnostic tests, at least in the United States [24]. Even
so, when Mildred Cho and colleagues interviewed 132 directors of
clinical genetic testing laboratories, 53% of respondents reported
that patents or licenses had impeded their ability to develop and
provide genetic tests [28].
Patents are a critical factor affecting access to medical care, but
they are not the only factor. Other factors influencing medical care
include demand for a product and market size (e.g., a large market
and high demand for a product might lead to considerable
revenue for the company even at a lower price),
Access to Innovation
The proliferation of patents may block biomedical R&D
because researchers are unable to obtain the many different
permissions required (e.g., permission may be required to use
patented reagents, to try a patented method, and/or use a
patented device) [28]. This situation has been called the ‘‘antic-
ommons’’ problem [29]—R&D is inhibited by the presence of
many intellectual property owners’ exclusive and possibly
conflicting rights over devices and methods needed to perform
R&D on biomedical products.
However, there is little empirical evidence that an anticommons
problem is impeding innovation. For example, the French
Community Innovation Survey found that 14% of R&D
collaborating firms had to abandon or delay their innovation
projects because of difficulties in their partnerships (‘‘cooperation
failures’’), and the survey explored reasons for such failures.
Intellectual property rights were not a cause of cooperation
failure—in fact, the authors found that ‘‘industries where firms are
able to better appropriate their research results (through patents,
models and secrecy) present lower rates of ‘cooperation failures’’’
[30].
In their analysis of how patents affect medical innovation in
Australia, Dianne Nicol and Jane Nielsen concluded that ‘‘in
general the Australian industry seems to be avoiding an antic-
ommons situation, but the potential still exists for its emergence’’
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[31]. In the US and Japan, there is also very little evidence of an
anticommons problem preventing innovation [32]. John Walsh
and colleagues surveyed 507 academic biomedical researchers,
asking them about the impact of patents on access to the
knowledge and material inputs that are used in subsequent
research [33]. The authors concluded that ‘‘access to knowledge
inputs is largely unaffected by patents.’’ A survey of 70 attorneys,
scientists, and managers in the biomedical research industry did
not find evidence of the anticommons problem [34].
In contrast, Stephen Meurer has shown that the anticommons
problem prevented a group of about 100 academic biologists from
building a worldwide human mutations database [35]. The
biologists tried to trade their data for corporate support of the
database. Although they received an offer of US$2.3 million, a
deadlock occurred because most members of the group could not
afford the information costs needed to reach a decision—a
prediction of the anticommons.
Access to materials and/or data—such as cell lines, reagents,
genetically modified animals, and unpublished information—can
be restricted if these are owned by other researchers. In a survey of
agricultural biologists [36], and based on my own experience in
biotechnology, delayed or blocked access to such materials results
from having to negotiate material transfer agreements (the
University of California, Berkeley defines a material transfer
agreement as ‘‘a contract that governs the transfer of tangible
research materials between two organizations, when the recipient
intends to use it for his or her own research purposes’’ [37]).
Restrictions on access do not appear to depend on whether the
material is itself patented [38]. Typically, no issued patents exist on
such materials covered by these material transfer agreements. But
it is the possibility of future patent protection and the desire on the
part of the supplier to manage this uncertainty that slows down or
even eliminates such transfers of technology.
Conclusion
What are we to make of all this? The actual evidence on
whether patents impede innovation or inventiveness in biomed-
icine is, in a word, ambiguous. Yet firms clearly tend to avoid
research projects for which there are many existing patents [39].
Both the process of determining which potentially relevant patents
are important to a research project and the negotiations for access
to them can delay, but less often kills, innovation. In industry and
universities, researchers adopt strategies of ‘‘licensing, inventing
around patents, going offshore, the development and use of public
databases and research tools, court challenges and … using the
technology without a license (i.e. infringement) to achieve their
particular goals’’ [39].
This raises the question, What are these various ‘‘design
around’’ actions manifestations of, if not actual patent blockages or
threats of the same? We act as if the anticommons block to
innovation is real. Perception is reality. Patents, or perhaps only
the fear of their enforcement, inhibit biomedical innovation. If we
knew how strong the inhibition really was, we would be having a
different debate.
James Orbinski’s, Sarah Harland Logan’s, and
Sevil N-Marandi’s Viewpoint: Patents Skew
Biomedical Research Toward Problems of the Rich
World
If patents represent a bargain between the claimant to
intellectual property (IP) and the state, and on balance should
benefit society, a key question in this age of globalization is ‘‘which
society?’’ The United Kingdom’s Royal Society, an independent
academy of science, rightly argues that ‘‘uses of intellectual
property that benefit people in one part of the world but
conspicuously fail to benefit others, or even act to their detriment,
are not what the [patent] system is supposed to be about’’ [40].
For developing countries, patents can impede medical care by
pricing medicines and other health care technologies (HCTs) out
of the reach of patients or their health care systems. Pharmaceu-
tical companies have little interest in pricing drugs for developing
country markets because they are seeking to maximize global not
national profits, and do not want to set a low price precedent that
would increase demand in wealthy countries for similar low prices
[41]. For those with a purchasing power less than what is needed
to meet minimal needs—i.e., most of the 3.8 billion people who
live on less than US$2 per day [42]—access to HCTs is little more
than a discomforting dream. Further, if a treatment is too
expensive, other factors that can affect medicines availability, such
as drug distribution systems and rational drug use policies, become
moot. Indeed, it was only when generic competition lowered the
price of antiretroviral therapy for HIV—from more than
US$15,000 per patient per year in 2001 to less than US$99 in
2007—that the policy debate shifted from whether such therapy
was possible in resource-poor settings to how to strengthen health
infrastructure to provide comprehensive HIV health care for
people in such settings [43,44].
To increase access to existing HCTs, governments can make use
of fully legal safety provisions of the World Trade Organization’s
Trade in Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS). These
provisions include compulsory licensing, which allows a govern-
ment to force a drug company to license its patent to a local
generic producer who must pay a royalty to the patent holder. But
a government is allowed to issue a compulsory license only after
price negotiations with the patent holder have failed. Nevertheless,
compulsory licensing remains a valuable tool, as memorably
shown in 2001 when South Africa issued compulsory licenses to
produce selected anttiretroviral drugs. Although 39 pharmaceuti-
cal companies attempted to sue South Africa’s government for
allegedly infringing on their patent rights, they ultimately chose to
withdraw this lawsuit in the face of immense public pressure [45].
The confrontation led the World Trade Organization to issue its
November 2001 Doha Declaration, which affirmed that ‘‘the
TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members
from taking measures to protect public health’’ [46].
Current patent laws also skew biomedical research to products
that yield high profits rather than to global priority health needs in
both developed and developing countries. Currently, malaria,
pneumonia, diarrhea, and tuberculosis, which together account for
21% of the global disease burden, receive 0.31% of all public and
private funds devoted to heath research [47,48]. More than 1
billion people—the overwhelming majority of whom are in the
developing world—suffer from neglected tropical diseases, those
for which there are inadequate or nonexistent treatments and a
paucity of research and development [49]. Of the 1,556 new
pharmaceutical compounds that appeared on the market between
1975 and 2004, just twenty of these drugs—1.3%—were for
tropical diseases and tuberculosis [50].
The international debate around patents has been largely
framed in terms of ‘‘protection for’’ versus ‘‘access to’’ IP. If the
framing of the debate shifts to a focus on research and
development, this is likely to strengthen the leverage of developing
countries to change the dynamics of IP negotiations in trade
agreements [51]. Entirely shifting the debate from IP rights to the
R&D gap may help tackle the fundamental problem of a
monopoly-based innovation and access system. One example is
nonexclusive licensing practices, such as those used by the not-for-
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profit Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (http://www.dndi.
org/). The initiative finances R&D up front and offers the
outcome of its research on a nonexclusive basis to generic
producers, allowing for technology transfer and competition
among multiple producers [51]. Furthermore, universities cur-
rently hold important patents on many life-saving drugs, including
the antiretroviral drugs stavudine (Yale University), abacavir
(University of Minnesota), lamivudine (Emory University), and
enfuvirtide (Duke University) [52]. In recognition of these
university patents, Universities Allied for Essential Medicines
(http://www.essentialmedicine.org) proposes that ‘‘when a uni-
versity licenses a promising new drug candidate to a pharmaceu-
tical company, it should require that the company allow the drug
to be made available in poor countries at the lowest possible cost’’
[53]. Another alternative to overcoming current patent barriers is
the use of patent pools, as proposed by the WHO, Me´decins Sans
Frontie`res, and UNITAID [54,55]. Here, a number of patents
held by different entities, such as companies, universities, or
research institutes, are pooled and made available to others for
production or further development—of, for example, pediatric
formulations or fixed-dose formulations. The patent holders
receive royalties that are paid by those who use the patents. The
pool manages the licenses, the negotiations with patent holders,
and the receipt and payment of royalties.
Other innovative policy proposals, such as the Heath Impact
Fund (a strategy to create a publicly funded ‘‘pot of gold’’ that
would attract the private sector to create R&D innovations that
effectively address priority global heath needs) [56], should be
implemented. However, using patents as the financial incentive to
encourage the pharmaceutical industry to develop drugs for the
world’s poor is of limited use where the market is nonexistent
because neither governments nor patients can afford the end
product [57]. Instead, framing the issue around global R&D, as
opposed to international IP rights, will aid in developing public–
private partnerships and a set of novel policy alternatives that
support approaches to addressing the public health needs of
developing nations [58].
The patent system as it affects access to and innovation for
HCTs is broken. The system must be reformed so that public
goods—such as genuine innovation and access to HCTs—are not
sacrificed on the altar of private gain. This reform must prioritize
the public good, use innovative policy tools to harness the private
sector where it is possible to do so, and create public R&D
capacity where market forces and actors are likely to continue to
fail.
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